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Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle:
A Message to Political Activists

INTRODUCTION

The Racketeer and Influenced Corrupt Organization (RICO) statute'
was enacted as part of Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970? The statute provides criminal penalties,3 as well as civil remedies 4
for the violation of four types of prohibited activity. The portion of the
statute providing civil remedies is known as civil RICO. This note focuses
on the application of civil RICO.
Since its enactment in 1970, the RICO statute has ridden the waves
of tempest and turmoil. The vague and poorly written statute encounters
judicial hostility and harsh criticism from legal commentators. In an effort to reform the inherent problems created by the statute's wording, Congress bats the statute between committees in both houses. Despite
legislative activity surrounding RICO, the statute remains unchanged.
In the absence of reform, courts continue to interpret and apply the RICO
statute liberally.
This note examines Northeast Women's Center,Inc v. McMonagle6 a
successful civil RICO claim brought by an abortion clinic against antiabortion activists who "used force, threats of force, fear and violence in
their efforts to force the clinic out of business "' 7 As a background to examining the case, this note will explore the RICO statute, the judicial
extension of RICO, and the current congressional action concerning
reform.
Analysis of Northeast reveals an emerging extension of civil RICO.
Civil RICO is applied to curb unlawful political protest. Such an extension allows certain victims of domestic terrorism private recovery of
damages. This note concludes that this extension of civil RICO serves
as appropriate private enforcement to deter structured, continuing
criminality.
18 U.S.C.S. § 1961 et. seq. (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1989).
2 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).

18 U.S.C.S § 1963 (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1989).
4 Id. § 1964.
3 Id. § 1962.
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1990
' 868 F.2d 1342 (3rd Cir. 1989).
' Id. at 1350.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Facts
The Northeast Women's Center, Inc. (Center) is a Pennsylvania corporation providing various gynecological services? One such service is
abortion? The Center filed an action in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania alleging illegal and tortious activity by twenty-six anti-abortion protesters' The suit centered around
the fourth occasion of trespass when the protesting allegedly exceeded
the demonstrators' constitutional rights of dissent and publication.
At trial, the Center presented evidence that the protesters had
unlawfully entered the Center's facilities on four different occasions. 2
The first occasion occurred on December 8, 1984, when approximately
fifty demonstrators rushed into the Center." During the entrance, protesters knocked down employees, blocked access to rooms, and strewed
medical equipment on the floor' 4 On the basis of this incident, the administrator of the Center decided to hire security guards to protect the
safety of the Center's employees and patients' 5 One employee testified
that she was injured in the incident and resigned her position at the
Center as a result of the harassment' 6 After this incident, thirty protesters were arrested and charged with trespass.P7 Twelve Defendants were
among the persons arrested.!"
The second incident occurred on August 10, 1985 when twelve Defendants defiantly entered the Center.!9 An employee testified that a number
of protesters locked themselves in an operating room.!0 As the protesters
left, the employee noticed an object concealed under the coat of one of
the protesters. Upon entering the room, the employee discovered the
machinery disassembled and damaged.2 Twelve Defendants were arrested
and convicted of defiant trespass for this incident. 2
'Id. at 1345.
Id.
10Id.

1 Id. at 1346.
12

Id. at 1345.

13

Id.

14 Id.
Is Id.

Id.
Id. at 1346.

'

Id.
I'
19

Id.

10

Id.

21

Id.

2Id.
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The third incident occurred on October 19, 1985 when protesters
once again attempted to enter the Center?' Only two succeeded?4 Among
the activists arrested were twenty-four Defendants. Three of them were
subsequently convicted of defiant trespass?5
The fourth incident occurred on May 23, 19862 A videotape of the
incident depicted the protesters "sitting down on the floor of the waiting
room inside the clinic, standing in front of patients awaiting services and
castigating them, and ignoring repeated requests that they cease trespassing and leave the building... One Defendant stated, 'We're going to shut
this place down.' "27 Police removed the trespassers?' Defendants on the
outside of the premises blocked the doors to the Center?9 Twenty-six persons were arrested?' Fifteen Defendants were convicted for criminal conspiracy, disorderly conduct, and/or defiant trespass as a result of this incident 3 1
Witnesses at the District Court trial testified to the Defendants'
behavior during the four incidents of protest and other occasions:
[Tihey observed Defendants photographing patients, chanting
through bullhorns, blocking building entrances, and surrounding and pounding on the windows of employees' cars. In fact,
an assistant district attorney who witnessed a demonstration
testified that the demonstrators' activity rose to a "frenzy" and
that he delayed leaving the Center out of fear for his physical
safety.... A doctor testified that the sound of chanting,
amplified by bullhorns, was audible in the Center's operating
room....
Three employees testified that2 they were repeatedly subjected to picketing at their homes?
Videotape evidence depicted the activists "pushing, shoving, and
tugging on patients as they attempted to approach the Center, knocking
over and crossing beyond the ingress of cars. A protester is recorded
stating, 'I bet you ten to one this place doesn't last six months. Another
added, 'This place is going to be shut down.' ,,3
23 Id.
Z4 Id.

2IId.
2Id.
27 Id.

Id.

29Id.
"Id.
31 Id.
2Id.
3Id.
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The Center brought the district court action against Defendants
alleging that Defendants had conspired among themselves to disrupt the
Center's business, to injure its property by harassing clients and
employees, to unlawfully enter the property, and to destroy and damage
medical equipment?' The Center sought damages and injunctive relief
under the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Clayton Act, RICO, and the common law torts of trespass and intentional interference with contractual
relations.35
The RICO and the common law tort actions were the only two claims
sent to the jury 6 The jury found twenty-seven Defendants liable under
RICO and assessed $887.00 in damages. The jury also found that three
Defendants interfered with the Center's contracts with employees, and
that twenty-four Defendants were liable for trespass. Damages were
assessed at $42,087.95 (compensatory) and $48,000.00 (punitive) 7 The
District Court granted a partial j.n.o.v. to the Defendants on the punitive
damage award and denied the Center injunctive relief.38
Issues on Appeal
The Plaintiffs appealed challenging the District Court's use of the
Unclean Hands Doctrine as a bar to injunctive relief and the Court's order
setting aside the punitive damage award. 9
The Court remanded the issue of injunctive relief to the district
court 40 and refused to reinstate punitive damages.

Issues on Cross-appeal
The Defendants cross-appealed challenging the application of civil
RICO, the availability of the justification defense, and various claims of
prejudicial error4 2 The Defendants did not succeed in any of their
challenges. The issues of prejudicial error were set aside by the appellate
court 43

" Id. at 1347.
15 Id.

' Id. The Center alleged a violation of 18 USCS § 1964(c). The Center alleged that Defendants
were participating in the conduct of an enterprise engaged in extortion under the Hobbs Act.
37 Id.
Id.
"Id. at 1345.
Id. at 1357.
41

Id.

" Id. at 1345.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol23/iss2/8
Id. at 1353.
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1. Denial of the Justification Defense
The Defendant's claimed that trying to save innocent lives was a
defense to the charges against them" The court rejected this defense by
stating that good motives do not constitute a legal defense45 In denying
46
the justification defense, the court quoted United States v. Malinowski:
"Such a position represents a feeble effort to emasculate basic principals
of civil disobedience, and simply stated, is invalid... [Tihe actor wants
worlds; to disobey, yet to be absolved of punishment for
the best of both
47
disobedience."

The abortion protestors had legal alternatives available to achieve
their goal; ie persuade women not to have abortions:" They could peacefully march, distribute literature, and discuss their political views with individuals in the community. While these legal alternatives were available,
the Defendants did not choose them. Instead, the Defendants' actions
broke the law and good intentions 49 cannot keep them from suffering the
consequences of their actions.0
2. Application of Civil RICO
The Defendants argued that civil RICO could not apply in this case
for three reasons. First, the Defendants' actions were protected by the
First Amendment right of dissent and publication 51 Second, the Center
had failed to establish the injury to its business or property required by
the RICO statute 2 Third, the Center had failed to prove an economic
motive for the extortion claim under the Hobbs Act. 3
a. Situational Scope of the First Amendment
In rejecting the Defendants' argument that their actions were protected by the first amendment, the court applauded the jury instruction
concerning the situational scope of the first amendment:

" Id. at 1351.
43 Id.

" 472 F.2d 850 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 411 U.S. 970 (1973).
47 Malinowski, 472 F.2d at 857.
46Northeast, 868 F.2d at 1352.
4' The court did not allow these abortion activists to act in furtherance of their political belief,
break the law, and then claim innocence from their crime because they believed they were helping
society.
I Id. at 1351.
11Id. at 1348.
52 Id. at 1349.
5Id.
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The First Amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees the defendants a right to express their views. The
defendants have a constitutional right to attempt to persuade
the Northeast Women's Center to stop performing abortions.
They have a constitutional right to attempt to persuade the
Center's employees to stop working there and they have a constitutional right to attempt to persuade the Center's patients
not to have abortions there... The mere fact, also, that the
defendants or some of their protests may be coercive or offensive, does not diminish the First Amendment right to a protest.
However... the First Amendment does not offer a sanctuary for violators. The same Constitution that protects the
defendants' right to free speech also protects the Center's right
to abortion services and the patients' rights to receive those
services.
The Court refused to allow the abortion activists to hide behind their
political belief where a jury had found that the actions extended beyond
lawful dissentV5
b. Injury Requirement of Civil RICO
The Defendants argued that the Center failed to establish injury
to its business or property as required under civil RICO 5 The court
answered this argument by carefully distinguishing the tangible economic
injury requirement under civil RICOV7 and the intangible injury requirement under the Hobbs ActP8
Under civil RICO, injury is satisfied by the mere evidence of tangible economic loss to the Center's business or propertyP9 Damage to the
Center's medical equipment during forcible entry was sufficient to meet
the civil RICO injury requirement6 0 Under the Hobbs Act, an intangible loss may be injuryP1 The Defendants violated the Hobbs Act by
" Id. at 1349.

Id.
5Id.

57

Id.

" Id. at 1350. Apparently, the court distinguished the injuries because the Defendant's argument was confused regarding which type of injury satisfied which violation. The RICO statute is
violated if any person participates in the conduct of an enterprise engaged in activity that violates
the Hobbs Act.
" Northeas4 868 F.2d at 1349.
6
Id.
61

Id. at 1350.
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"attempting and conspiring to extort from the Center its property interest
in continuing to provide abortion services; from its employees, their property interest in continuingtheir employment with the Center; and from
patients, their property interest in entering into a contractualrelationship with the Center."'
The extortion of intangible interests violated the Hobbs Act. This
violation was used as the predicate offense in the RICO claim. Committing a predicate offense under RICO triggers the recovery of civil damages.
Civil damages are equal to the amount of tangible economic loss to the
victim's business or property while the extortion was happening. In Northeast, proof of damage to medical equipment triggered the civil RICO
damage recovery."
c Motive of Extortion under the Hobbs Act
Defendants' claimed that extortion must have an economic motive.
They argued that the protestors did not have an economic motive and
did not even receive the benefit of the alleged extortion of the property
interests. The court rejected this argument. Under the Hobbs Act, money
does not have to be the motive of extortion. The extortionist does not even
have to receive the benefit of his actions05
The court reasoned that the Center's property interest in continuing business, the employees' property interest in continuing their employment, and the patients property interest in doing business with the center
are all intangible interests. The protestors' conduct attempted to take
these interests away. The protestors' conduct amounted to an extortion
of intangible interests' 6
BACKGROUND

RICO Statute
The RICO statute 7 was enacted as part of Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970Ps The statute provides criminal penalties,69
as well as civil remedies,7° for four types of prohibited activities?'
2 Id. (emphasis added).
" See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
"4Northeast, 868 F.2d at 1349.
United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415, 420 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1043, (1980).
See also United States v. Starks, 515 F2d 112, 124 (3rd Cir. 1975) (permitting extortion for a religious
purpose); United States v. Anderson, 716 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1983) (permitting extortion for threats
against a doctor as inducement to cease performing abortions).
"Id.
67 18 U.S.C.S §§ 1961-1968 (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Suppl 1989).
"Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
" 18 U.&C.S § 1963 (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1989).
70 Id. § 1964.

Published
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The statute makes it unlawful for any person: (A) to receive and
invest income derived from the racketeering activity of an interstate enterprise; 72 (B) to acquire or maintain any interest in an interstate enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity; 73 (C) to participate in
the conduct of an interstate enterprise engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity; 4 or (D) to conspire to violate any of the above provisions?
"Pattern of racketeering activity" is a frequently recurring phrase
within the list of prohibited activities. The statute defines this phrase
as requiring "at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred within ten years... after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity.'7 7 Racketeering activity, specifically, consists of eight
7
chargeable state crimes and twenty-eight indictable federal crimes
72

Id. § 1962(a) states in part: It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income

derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an
unlawful debt... to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of income, or the proceeds of such
income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which
it engages in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
"'Id. § 1962(b) states: It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an an unlawful debt to acquire to maintain, directly or indirectly,
any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce.
" Id. § 1962(c) states: It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct
or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern
of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
" Id. § 1962(d) states: It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
'6Id § 1961(5) (Law. Co-op. 1979 and Supp. 1989).
7 Id.
§ 1961(1) states:
As used in this chapter [18 USCS 99 1961-19681 (1) "racketeering activity" means (A)
any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under
State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which
is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), section 471,472,
and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to
embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate
credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of
criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law
enforcement), section 1951 (relatingto interferencewith commerce robbery,or extortion),
section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation or wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund
payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses),
section 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-24
(relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United
States Code, section 186 f29 USCS § 186] (dealing with restrictions on payments and
loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) [29 USCS § 501(c)] (relating to embezzlement from union funds), (D) any offense involving bankruptcy fraud, fraud in the sale
of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buy
ing,selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol23/iss2/8
any law of the United States (emphasis added).
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These racketeering activities listed within the statute are commonly referred to as "predicate acts" or "predicate offenses "' 7 8 Of particular interest to this note is the inclusion of the Hobbs Act within the list of
predicate offenses. 9
For violations of'the RICO provisions, the statute provides both
criminal penalties8 0 and civil remedies.8 The civil remedy provision permits: (a) the federal district courts to issue appropriate orders to prevent
and restrain violations of the four prohibited acts, 2 (b) the Attorney
General to institute proceedings under civil RICO,83 (c) victims injured
in their business or property, to sue and recover treble damages and costs
including reasonable attorney fees,4 and (d) a final judgment in any
criminal proceeding to estop the defendant from denying allegations of
the criminal offense in any subsequent civil proceeding. (emphasis added).
Section c, above, is the portion of the civil remedy provision that allows
for private recovery of money damages.
While the actual intent of Congress in enacting this statute has
been debated 86 Congress has clearly stated:
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of
organizedcrime in the United States by strengthening the legal
tools in the evidence gathering process, by establishing new
penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and
new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime 7
When reading the statute definitions,88 there is a conspicuous
absence of a definition for "organized crime." Congress found the term
"8Morgan, Civil RICO: The Legal Galaxy's Black Hole, 22 AKRON L. REV.107, 109 (1988).
"8See supra note 67.
18 U.S.C.S. § 1963 (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1989).
8 Id. § 1964.
" Id. § 1964(a).
83 Id. § 1964(b).
" Id. § 1964(c). Civil RICO provision for private recovery.
63Id. § 1964(d).
"See Sedima, 473 U.S at 499. Compare with Sedima, 473 U.s at 527 (Powell, J., dissenting);
see generally Oversight on Civil RICO Suits: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (statement of C. Marinaccio, Member of the Securities and Exchange
Commission) and (statement of I. Nathan, for American Property and Casualty Insurance Industry)
(inferring Congress intended the RICO Statute to reach only the archetypal mobster); Melley, The
Stretchingof Civil RICO: Pro-Life Demonstratorsare Racketeers? 56 UMKC L. REv. 287, 309 (1988)
(Congress never intended the RICO statute to be used against pro-life activists staging
demonstrations).
87 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (emphasis added).
88 18 U.SC.S. § 1961 (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1989).
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defineP9

Rather than trying to define the
too amorphous to specifically
term, the drafters focused on the activities engaged in by organized crime?*
The drafters realized that the statute might reach into activity outside
the sphere of organized crime?
To compensate for the over-inclusive nature of the statute, some circuit courts took it upon themselves to limit the scope of the statute
through interpretation. Organized crime was interpreted by many circuit courts to mean the stereotypical "Mafia Family "' 2 Despite the fact
that Congress directed that the statute "be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purpose " ' 93 many circuit courts specifically limited the
cause of action to persons associated with crime families?4 Courts accomplished these limitations through judicially imposed restrictions in
bringing the cause of action?5 Overall, the circuits' treatment of the RICO
statute was diverse. Depending on the jurisdiction, the statute might be
construed liberally (applying it to any violation) or by judicial limitation
6
(only applying it to persons associated with a crime family)
JudicialExtension of Civil RICO
The diverse treatment, in regard to whom the RICO statute would
apply, was finally addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1985. The
Court, in Sedima S.PR.L u Imrex Ca, Inc 97 choose the liberal application that congress had directed. The Court's choice was not surprising.
Early treatment of criminal RICO cases predicted the Sedima decision.
9 strongly
Both United States v. Turkette9 8 and Russello v United StatesP
suggested that all RICO cases would receive the liberal construction that
Congress directed.P°
" Koenig, What Have They Done to Civil RICO: The Supreme Court hkes the Racketeering Requirement Out of Racketeering.35 AM. U.L. REv. 821, 830-1 (1986). See Oversight on Civil RICO
Suits, supra note 86, at 122 (testimony of Stephen S, Trott).
90Id.

" See Oversight on Civil RICO, supranote 86, at 123. "It is impossible to draw an effective statute
which reaches most of the commercial activities of organized crime, yet does not include offenses
commonly committed by persons outside organized crime as well." (quoting Senator McClellan, the
principal Senate sponsor of the RICO legislation).
" See, Annotation, Civil Action For Damages under 18 USC.S. § 1964(c) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act for Injuries Sustained by Reason of Racketeering Activities,
70 A.L.R. FED. 538, 552-53 (1984).
Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 947 (1970).
94See supra note 92.
" See Oversight on Civil RICO Suits, supranote 86, at 123-24. See also Goldsmith and Keith,
Civil RICO Abuses: The Allegations in Context, B.YU. L. REv. 55, 64 (1986).
"See supra note 86. See also Oversight on Civil RICO Suit, supra note 86, at 418-19 (Congress
expected diverse treatment and included the liberal construction clause in the statute to avoid the
effects of judicial hostility toward the statute).
"473 U.S. 479 (1985).
"452 U.S. 576 (1981).
" 464 U.S. 16 (1983).

'"See Civil RICO Abuses: The Allegations in Contest, supra note 95, at 65.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol23/iss2/8
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In Sedima, the Court removed two judicially imposed limitations
in bringing a civil RICO action. 1 First, the Court struck down the
racketeer injury limitation, finding that the injury need not be caused
by the conduct that RICO was designed to deter.'02 Second, the Court held
against a defendant who did
that a civil RICO action could be brought
°3
conviction.
criminal
prior
a
have
not
The Sedima decision, in effect, extended the civil RICO cause of
action to the ordinary commercial setting! 14 The Court commented that
if the extension was a defect, then the correction would lie with Congress
in amending and clearly defining the statutory language °5 After the
Court's call for legislative revision, the debate on civil RICO switched
to the congressional forum.
CongressionalAction Since Sedima
Despite the Sedima Court's call for legislative revision as the means
of limiting civil RICO, no revisions have been made to date. Congress
continues to discuss the issue,/°6 and several bills have been introduced.!0 7
After four years, the need for revision nor the method of revision have
been agreed upon.
Many commentators complain that extension of civil RICO to the
commercial arena is an abuse of the RICO statute.!"s In general, the
business community agrees. ° Most of these complaints stem from the
use of civil RICO to "garden variety" fraud cases!"° The complainers do
not view the "garden variety fraud" that occurs in the business arena
comparable to organized crime!"
The lobbies of securities brokers, accountants, and insurance com101473 U.S. 479 (1985).
10'

Id. at 495.

103

Id.

104
105

Id. at 499.
Id.

'0o There have been fifty-five presentations before Congress concerning civil RICO since May
1985. (Search conducted on WESTLAW, Congressional Record data-base.)
107 Congressional attention on civil RICO reform legislation has primarily focused on bills introduced by Representative Frederick Boucher (D-Virginia) and Senator Howard Metzenbaum (ROhio). During the 99th Congress, Representative Boucher sponsored H.R. 2943. In the Senate,
Senators Orrin Hatch and Howard Metzenbaum introduced S. 1521 and S 1523, respectively. None
of the bills passed. During the 100th Congress, Boucher presented H.R. 5445 before the House and
Metzenbaum sponsored S. 1523 before the Senate. H. R. 5445 passed easily, but S, 1523 was narrowly defeated by three votes. During the 101st Congress, Feb. 22, 1989, Boucher once again introduced civil RICO reform legislation before the House as companion legislation to S. 1523.
"04 See generally,Melley, supranote 86; Koenig, supranote 89; Goldsmith and Keith, supra note 95.

Id.
Id.
111Id.
log

110
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reform.!"2

panies push for legislative
As a result, reform legislation centers
around curbing the abuse of civil RICO in commercial transactions."'
Congress is searching for ways to curb abuse while perserving RICO's
benefits in combating organized criminality." 4 To preserve RICO's benefits,
Congress refuses to limit the definition of organized crime to the
stereotypical crime family."s
ANALYSIS
Extension of Civil RICO
Upon the surface, there is nothing particularly striking about the
appellate court decision in Northeast." The court applied sound legal
reasoning backed by strong precedent to reach its decision. The case
becomes intriguing as one examines the combination of holdings to the
cross-appeal. In essence the court said that despite good motive, political
7
protest extending beyond the first amendment right is not protected."
If this unprotected activity rises to the character of extortion, taking from
another the right to continue his business, the extortion violates the RICO
statute." When the RICO statute is violated, a victim may recover
resulting tangible economic damage to their business or property." 9 Northeast is part of an emerging extension of civil RICO, an extension to the
new arena of unlawful political protest. The extension of civil RICO
damages to this arena is proper and consistent with the purpose of the
RICO statute.
Extension Consistent with the Purpose of the RICO Statute
1. Congressional Intent to Eradicate Organized Crime
When the RICO statute was enacted, Congress intended to eradicate
continuing organized criminality.20 When Congress drafted the statute,
112 Jones,

Civil RICO and the General Practioner,5 COMPLEAT LAWYER 37, 38 (1988).
113See generally, Goldsmith and Keith, supra note 80.
Id.
I" The controversy surrounding the application of RICO centers on the definition of organized
crime. By refusing to limit the definition to the stereotypical crime family, Congress is recognizing
that organized criminality occurs in other contexts including the commercial setting. See supranote
97 (proposed reform legislation).
'16 Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342.
117 Id.
'is Id.
114

119 Id.
120 See

supra note 87.
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they refused to specifically define the term "organized crime "' 12' What
Congress meant by the term "organized crime" then and what Congress
means now appears to be quite different. In 1970, Congress may have
22
meant for organized crime to relate to the stereotypical crime family
Nineteen years later, in 1989, Congress has not attempted to limit the
definition to the mob 23 An inference can be drawn from the refusal to
limit the definition that Congress recognizes the existence of organized
criminality in other forms. Such an inference is strengthened by comments of other branches of government. The Justice Department publicly recognizes organized crime in a variety of forms including unlawful
political protest.! 4

2. Unlawful Political Protest as Organized Crime
25
All Americans have a protected right of lawful civil disobedience.
If the form of civil disobedience exceeds first amendment protection, the
protest becomes unlawful. 2 Good motives will not excuse the unlawful
conduct 27

Some forms of political protest, exceeding first amendment protection, rise to the character of force and violence. Acts of political protest
have included murder, arson, and attempts to blow up a natural gas
pipeline. 28 These acts are unlawful political protest.

In the eyes of the law, it doesn't matter whether the Klu Klux Klan,
the neo-Nazi's, or pro-life demonstrators commit the crime. Each group
engages in unlawful conduct. Arson committed by pro-life demonstrators
is no less unlawful than arson committed by a neo-Nazi organization.
The motive behind the unlawful conduct cannot justify the crime.

supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
supra note 86.
supra notes 106 and 107.
infra note 133 and accompanying text.
15 U.S CONST. amend. I.
1,'
See supra notes 54 and 55 and accompanying text.

1" See
See
.. See
11 See

See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
See Oversight on Civil RICO Suits, supra note 86, at 111; U.S v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42 (2d
Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 104 S.Ct. 283 (1983) (Croation terrorists); Portland Feminist Women's Health
Center v. Advocates for Life, Inc. 1988 WL 156180 (D.Or. 1988) (unreported decision).
",
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Unlawful conduct by the Klu Klux Klan and the neo-Nazi organizations is characterized as a form of domestic terrorism.!2 e The characterization of domestic terrorism encompasses unlawful forms of political protest by anti-abortion activists. Domestic terrorism is a form of organized
crime the RICO statute was designed to eradicate. The aim of the statute
is to eliminate organized continuing criminal enterprises.!" °
RICO has been credited as a significant roadblock to groups engagofficials have coning in domestic terrorist activity.!" Law enforcement
3s
victed domestic terrorist groups under RICO. '
In a statement before the Committee on the Judiciary, Stephen S.
Trott, the Assistant Attorney General, representing the Department of
Justice, applauded significant criminal RICO achievements against
groups acting upon their political beliefs:
Nor has RICO been limited to traditional organized
crime... For the same reason that RICO has proved so effective against the mob, it has become an effective tool against
domestic terrorism, as evidenced by two RICO indictments last
month. A case in Seattle alleges that twenty-three members
of "The Order" engaged in acts of terrorism and violence, including the murder of a well-known Denver radio personality.
In Arkansas, a RICO indictment was filed against members of
a neo-Nazi organization called "The Covenant, the Sword, and
the Arm of the Lord" for alleged arson of religious33buildings
and an attempt to blow up a natural gas pipeline.
Northeast is a case where twenty-six individuals, in concert, conspired and attempted to extort from the Center its right to conduct a
lawful business by trying to "shut it down "134 The activists, trying to

'o
130

See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
Id.

131 Proposed RICO Reform Legislation: Hearing on S. 1523 Before the Senate Comm. on the

Judiciary,100th Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1987) [hereinafter Proposed RICO Reform] (statement of the
National Assoc. of Attorneys Gen. on RICO Reform) (citing The Hate Movement, ADL Special Study
1987). (A study by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith concluding that neo-Nazi and the
Klu Klux Klan are suffering serious setback as a result of RICO prosecutions and civil suits)).
132 U.S v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 283 (1983) (Croation terrorists); Portland Feminist Women's Health Center v. Advocates for Life, Inc., 1988 WL 156180 (D.Or.
1988) (unreported decision).
1'3See Oversight on Civil RICO Suits supra note 86, at 111.
'" See generally,Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342.
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hide behind their political beliefs, acted beyond their first amendment
protection." 5 The anti-abortion activists "used force, threats of force, fear
and violence in their efforts to force the Center out of business."'I " Such
unlawful conduct, despite any good motive is domestic terrorism. The
unlawful conduct of the abortion protestors, terroristic in nature, is
organized continuing criminality by an enterprise. Conduct that RICO
is designed to eradicate.
Benefits of Civil RICO Extension
The extension of civil RICO damages to the arena of unlawful
political protest buttresses traditional law enforcement methods and provides restitution to victims of organized crime.
1. Buttresses Traditional Law Enforcement Methods
Drafters of RICO recognized that traditional law enforcement efforts failed to reach the roots of the criminal activity of organizations. 37
The statute was designed to buttress traditional enforcement which only prosecutes individuals. 38 The statute allows officials to reach past the
individuals and seize the organized network supporting the criminal activity. Groups which organize, conspire, and attempt to commit unlawful
activities may perpetuate their goals despite the fact that individual
members may be removed from their ranks. The soldiers, once removed,
will simply be replaced by another willing to carry out the aim of the
group's activities.
In Northeast,civil and criminal trespass actions against Defendants
were available to curtail the activists' demonstrations. 40 Opponents to
the use of civil RICO in Northeast argue that these traditional law enforcement methods are sufficient.4 1 These methods are not sufficient,
evidenced by the four separate incidents of forced entry resulting in convictions. The traditional methods were used, but the unlawful form of
demonstrations were not curtailed 42 Use of civil RICO in Northeastbuttressed traditional methods that were not effective in deterring the
organized continuing criminality.
1 Id. at 1349.
Id. at 1350.
...See Goldsmith and Keith, supra note 95, at 60-61.
138

Id.

1" Id.

" Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342.
141See Melley, supra note 86, at 309-10.
141 Northeast, 868 F.2d 1342.
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Abortion activists are usually lead by the pro-life philosophy. The
leaders and organizers of the protestors may be priests or other types
of upstanding members of the community. Many community members
sympathize with the goals of the protest and view the protestors as champions of a virtuous social cause. Because of the community standing and
virtuous goals of the protestors, criminal and civil trespass convictions
result in mild sentencing, even probation. Such leniency toward the individual soldiers has little deterrence in stopping the enterprise from conspiring unlawful forms of protest.
2. Civil RICO Provides Restitution
Civil RICO provides private recovery of damages to victims.4 3 Victims of a RICO violation may sue and recover treble damages for tangible economic injury to their business or property, plus costs and reasonable
attorney fees." Civil RICO was intended as a weapon in stopping organized crime. "Treble damage suits under RICO promise remedial relief
against such outrageous conduct that will be swift, sure, and severe.. 211
The RICO statute provides an avenue for victims of unlawful
political protest to recover civil damages. In United States v. Anderson,
the Hobbs Act was used to convict anti-abortion activists for threatening a doctor as inducement to cease performing abortions.' But under
the Hobbs Act, without RICO, the doctor (the victim) did not have an action for civil remedies. Bringing a RICO action against the activists, while
using the Hobbs Act to satisfy the predicate offense, allows the victim
47
private recovery.
It has been argued that extending civil damages to cases of the
character of Northeastrisks penalties out of proportion to the wrong committed.' s This argument is not plausible. The civil damage provision
allows for recovery to be approximately three times the amount of tangible economic damage.'4 The variation in the amount of damages will

148

See supra note 84. Civil RICO permits victims, injured in their business or property, to sue

and recover treble damages and costs including reasonable attorney fees.
144 Id.
145

See Oversight on Civil RICO, supra note 86, at 122 (testimony of Stephen Trott).

14 United States v. Anderson, 716 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1983).

See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
See Melley, supra note 86, at 310.
148 18 U.S.C.S. § 1964(c) (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1989).

147

148
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directly relate to the amount of harm incurred. A small amount of damage
results proportionately in greater recovery. The argument not only fails
to acknowledge the formula for recovery, but infers that cases of this
character commit little wrong. This assumption is not correct. Antiabortion activists, who perhaps view themselves as white knights and
great champions of social causes, have been convicted of unlawful protest in the form of threatening life and burning down clinics. 50
The suggestion has also been made that civil damages threaten individuals from exercising their right to speak freely. 51 This argument
is not plausible. Civil damages would never be applied to the peaceful
protest which is the lawful exercise of free speech protected by the first
amendment. Northeast did not say that organized groups of people,
peacefully protesting and publicizing their political views will be liable
to a business in treble damages, even if the protest interferes with the
conduct of the business. Application of civil RICO requires more than
that. ' 2 The acts of expression must extend beyond the protection of the
first amendment to unlawful activity. 53 At that point, civil damages may
be incurred to the amount of any tangible economic injury to that
business.
CONCLUSION

THE MESSAGE Northeast sends to political activists is clear. Peaceful
demonstrations are protected by the first amendment, but when activities
exceed lawful dissent and publication and rise to the character of force,
fear, and violence, such acts rise to the character of domestic terrorism.
When these acts are carried out in a continuing pattern by an organization with the intent to interfere with the right to conduct a lawful
business, civil RICO will apply. Application of civil RICO is consistent
with the purposes of the RICO statute, providing restitution to victims
of organized crime and buttressing traditional law enforcement methods
that have not been sufficient to halt organized criminality.

Jo ANNE POOL

150Feminist

Women's Health Center v. Roberts, 1989 WL 56017 (W.D. Wash. 1989) (unreported

decision) (Defendants convicted of arson of abortion clinic). United States v. Anderson, 716 F.2d 446
(7th Cir. 1983).
See Melley, supranote 86, at 309-10; see also ProposedRICO Reform, supranote 131, at 316-17
...
(statement of Antonio Califa, Legis. Counsel, ACLU).
" See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
15 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
1
See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
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